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State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts
In 1836 Story in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, after
outlining the development of equity jurisdiction over foreign suits, pro-
ceeded to state:
"It is now held that whenever the parties are resident within a coun-
try, the courts of that country have full authority to act upon them
personally with respect to the subject of suits in a foreign country, as
the ends of justice may require . ... There is one exception which
has long been recognised in America; and that is, that the State courts
cannot injoin proceedings in the courts of the United States; nor the
latter in the former courts. This exception proceeds upon peculiar
grounds of municipal and constitutional law, the respective courts
being entirely competent to administer full relief in the suits pending
therein." '
Of the many possible situations in which, under a federal system of govern-
ment, a court may be asked to issue an injunction against proceedings in
another court, the two exceptional ones described by Story are peculiar to
that system. Such injunctions may for brevity's sake be designated as
state-federal injunctions (i. e. state injunctions against proceedings in a
federal court) and federal-state injunctions. They involve two limited
sovereigns which are, however, not identical (as is the case whenever a
state court is asked to restrain proceedings in the courts of a sister state)
but rather complementary, and the power of which is territorially co-
extensive.2  The problem presented by these types of injunctions is not
whether there is jurisdiction over the parties, but rather, assuming the
existence of such jurisdiction, whether the Constitution forbids the exercise
thereof.
The federal-state injunction is governed by a statute,; first enacted in
1793, which prohibits its issuance but which had come to be considered as a
mere declaratory enactment of a pre-existing rule. 4  Therefore it could
safely be assumed that the granting of state-federal injunctions, while not
regulated by any statute, was nevertheless restricted to the same extent
through reciprocal application 5 to the converse situation of the rule under-
lying the statute.
i. STORy, EquIy JuDisPRuDENCE (Ist ed. 1836) § 9oo. (Italics added.) The
statement has been repeated in all subsequent editions of his work.
2. The distinction is brought out by Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun 204 (N.
Y. 1884) (injunction granted against proceedings in the courts of the District of Colum-
bia), in which the court did not use the rule generally applied in New York with regard
to federal proceedings.
3. I STAT. 81 (1793). It has been preserved as amended, in Section 265 of the
Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1934), and now reads:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay
proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be
authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
4. In 1920 the Supreme Court thought it was "intended to give effect to a familiar
rule of comity and like that rule . . . limited in its field of operation." Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183 (1920).
5. For two clear cases illustrating the tendency of the courts to apply a rule of
reciprocity see Prugh v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896)
and Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, 85 S. W. 71 (9o5).
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The Supreme Court, however, has indicated at the present term that
it no longer regards the statute as a declaratory enactment. 6  The great
significance of these decisions with respect to federal-state injunctions is
equalled by their possible repercussions on the granting of state-federal
injunctions for they are open to implications that, in the absence of
the statute, the federal courts would be free to enjoin proceedings in the
state courts and that, consequently, state courts, unhampered as they are by
any statutory prohibition, can enjoin proceedings in the federal courts as
they do those in the courts of a sister state. The foregoing conclusion
seems to.have been reached previously by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in one
of his recent dissenting opinions:
"... the decision . . . [of the majority of the court does not] give
new currency to the discredited notion that there is a general lack of
power in the state courts to enjoin proceedings in federal courts ....
Nothing in Article III of the Constitution or in the legislation by
which Congress has vested judicial powers in the federal courts justi-
fies such a doctrine." 7
Hence the matter is far from settled.
The federal-state injunction has been high-lighted in litigation and
commentary." The purpose of this note is to explore the relatively neg-
lected field of state-federal injunctions.0 The origin and the nature of
Story's dogma will first be examined together with the cases which estab-
lished it in the law. The bearing which the pendency of federal proceedings
has on the denial of an injunction will then be discussed, likewise the
bearing of the stage to which such proceedings have progressed. Injunc-
tions against attempted relitigation of issues previously adjudicated by a
state court will next be adverted to. Finally a separate section will be
devoted to the cases decided under the federal Employers' Liability Act.
ORIGIN, NATURE AND RECEPTION OF STORY'S DOGMA
Story's doctrine of non-interference was not enunciated on the bench
of the Supreme Court, but it exerted a widespread influence on the courts
of the nineteenth century and is still cited in comparatively recent cases. 10
6. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 139 (1941) and Southern
Ry. v. Painter, 62 Sup. Ct. 154 (1941).
7. 62 Sup. Ct. 6, 11 (1941), (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 489. In support of this
dictum Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 546
(1939) and to Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (193o) 43 HARv. L.
REV. 345.
8. Durfee and Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The
Life History of a Statute (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145; Taylor and Willis, The
Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. 3.
ii6g; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 Hwv. L. REV. 345.
9. There appears to be little law review material dealing with the topic; see Note
_19o9) ii Am. & ENG. ANN. CASES 744. Professor Warren in his article Federal and
State Court Interference, cited note 8 supra, discusses the whole topic of conflict of
state and federal courts. The present note deals only with the state injunction against
federal suit which is but one phase of that broader topic. For a textbook statement of
the rule see PomERoy, J., EQUITABLE REmEDIES (2d ed. igig) § 64; but see HIGH,
INJUNCTIONS (4 th ed. 19o5) §§ nl1, 266.
io. Central National Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432, 46r (1898); Moran v. Stur-
ges, 154 U. S. 256, 268 (1894) ; Southern Ry. v. Painter, 117 F. (2d) loo, io6 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1941) ; Fort v. Lang Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 527, 528, i8o Atl. 395, 396 (Ch. 1935) ;
Twaits v. Penna. R R, 77 N. J. Dq. 103, IO, 75 Atl io01, 12 (Ch. i9io); Clark
v. Bankers' Trust Co., 177 App. Div. 627, 639, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544, 552 (Ist Dep't
1917) ; Beardslee v. Ingraham, 183 N. Y. 411, 417, 76 N. E. 476, 477 (19o6).
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This influence is the more remarkable in view of the fact that no case what-
soever was cited as authority for his dogmatic statement; four cases, how-
ever, were mentioned in support of the reason given for the rule, namely
that the respective courts are entirely competent to give full relief in the
suits pending therein. One of them was an English case which did not
involve an injunction." The second one, Diggs v. Wolcott, 2 held, without
relying on the federal statute, that a federal court cannot enjoin proceedings
in a state court. McKim v. Voorhies Is involved a federal judgment, the
enforcement of which the defendant asked the state court to restrain; an
injunction pendente lite was granted and a copy notified to the clerk of the
federal court, who thereupon refused to issue a writ of execution to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion to instruct the clerk to issue the writ was
denied; on appeal the Supreme Court ordered the writ issued. The ques-
tion of the power of the court to issue state-federal injunctions was not
before the Supreme Court,14 and the statement that "the state court had no
jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the United
States", 5 while quite significant, was mere dictum; Story so understood
the case and refrained from citing it as authority for his rule. In Mead v.
Merritt,' the fourth of these cases, an executor obtained an injunction
restraining the assignee of a claim against the estate from suing in the
state courts of Connecticut where it was alleged the executor would not be
able to set off his personal claim. The New York court held that no ground
for equitable relief was shown and stated that "Although . . . [the] court
has the physical power to act coercively on the parties within the jurisdic-
tion . . . it has frequently been decided that it would not sustain an injunc-
tion bill to restrain a suit previously commenced in a court of a sister state,
or in any of the federal courts . . . . Not only comity, but public policy
forbids the exercise of such a power." 17 (Italics added) The italicized
part of the sentence quoted is obviously a dictum; as for the remainder, it
is at best an unsound alternative holding since the power of a state to enjoin
proceedings in the courts of a sister state was well recognized in Story's
time. Such was the state of the authorities in 1836.
McKim v. Voorhies and Diggs v. Wolcott both adopted the language
of reciprocal lack of jurisdiction over federal and state proceedings and
Story phrased his dogma in much the same terms; if his words are to be
taken at their face value they lead to the conclusion, so vigorously opposed
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that there is a general lack of power to issue
state-federal injunctions. In Mead v. Merritt, however, the opinion was
couched in terms of non-exercise of an existing power because of a rule
of comity and of public policy. To be sure it is hard to perceive what dif-
ference exists between a total lack of power in a given situation and the
existence of a power if that power will never be exercised in the same sit-
uation. It is at most one of emphasis.
That the New York rule was founded on comity (though of course
not on mere judicial discretion) rather than on a general lack of power,
ii. Cruikshank v. Robarts, 6 Madd. 104, 56 Eng. Rep. R. io3i (V. C. 1821).
12. 4 Cranch *179 (U. S. 1807).
13. 7 Cranch *279 (U. S. 1812).
14. Either the injunction was addressed to the court and then the case merely
stands for the obvious proposition that such an injunction is bad; or it ran to the party
only and then it raised the sole question whether a writ of execution should issue irre-
spective of the state injunction. Aliter if the case had come up on appeal from the state
court decision granting the injunction.
15. 7 Cranch *279, *281 (U. S. 1812).
16. 2 Paige 4o2 (N. Y. 1831).
17. Id. at 404, 405.
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was emphasized in the interesting case of Schuyler v. Pelissier,s decided
in 1838, which was the first one to hold that a state-federal injunction will
not be granted. There an alien sued the plaintiff, a citizen of New York,
in the federal circuit court, whereupon plaintiff filed a bill of interpleader
in the state court naming as defendants the alien and another citizen of New
York, both of whom allegedly claimed an interest in the funds held by
plaintiff. The bill could not have been filed on the equity side of the federal
court but an injunction restraining the federal proceedings at law was
denied. The court felt that there was nothing in McKim v. Voorhies to
forbid the interposition of a state court by injunction but it also thought
that the question was not an open one and that it was "bound by author-
ity"; the only authority cited, however, was Mead v. Merritt. Even if
the opinion had relied on Story it would remain hard to understand how
that result was reached. Story's rule was based on an assumption that the
equity side of the federal courts can always give the needed relief-here
relief could not be given.
However, the rule was widely accepted without any qualification. In
only one of the early cases, Akerly v. Vilas,20 was it asserted that there is
nothing in the relation between state and federal courts to justify a special
rule.2 1 The opinion contains an interesting, if somewhat confused, resume
of many of the arguments generally advanced in connection with the prob-
lem.2 2  By the middle of the reconstruction era nine jurisdictions had
adopted the rule,23 and the majority of them had done so on the authority
of Story's statement. 24  A few among them, including New York, de-
rived the rule from comity. In Georgia, where the courts relied on Story,
the rule was nevertheless one of comity and it may well be that this was
the proper construction of Story's statement. He formulated his dogma as
an exception to a general doctrine and as the scope of the exception nar-
rowed with the years, more and more courts relinquished the concept of
lack of power, at least with respect to injunctions against proceedings prior
to judgment; 25 comity lent itself better to the evolution because each juris-
18. 3 Edw. Ch. *191 (N. Y. 1838).
19. Id. at "193.
20. 15 Wis. 40 (1862).
21. Id. at 412.
22. The court stated, in substance, that there is no total lack of power to issue
state-federal injunctions, that when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction the court
which first acquired jurisdiction should keep it to the exclusion of the other one and
can protect it by issuing ancillary injunctions, and that, therefore, the argument of
comity would have been more appropriately urged in the federal court in which the
second suit had been brought. The argument of reciprocity was also used by the court
which emphasized that the federal courts had often enjoined proceedings in the state
courts.
23. U. S.: Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867); see Peck v. Jen-
ness, 7 How. 612, 624 (U. S. 1849) ; McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch *279, *281 (U. S.
1812). California: Phelan v. Smith, 8 Cal. 52o (1857). Georgia: Bryan v. Hickson,
4o Ga. 405 (1869); Strozier v. Howes, 3o Ga. 578 (i86o) ; see Hines v. Rawson, 40
Ga. 356, 359 (1869). Illinois: Logan v. Lucas, 59 Ill. 237 (1871). Iowa: See Ex
parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, 105 (1869). Michigan: See Carroll v. Farmers' and Me-
chanics' Bank, Harr. Ch. 197, 204 (Mich. 1840). New York: Mariposa Co. v. Garri-
son, 26 How. Pr. 448 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1864); Thompson v. Van Vechten, 5 Duer 618
(N. Y. Super. Ct. I855) ; Coster v. Griswold, 4 Edw. Ch. 364 (N. Y. 1844) ; Schuyler
v. Pelissier, 3 Edw. Ch. *191 (N. Y. 1838). Rhode Island: Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. L
453 (86o). South Carolina: English v. Miller, 2 Rich. Eq. 320 (S. C. 1845).
z1. Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Rhode Island and South Carolina form this majority.
The Michigan court relied on the same dicta in Merritt v. Paige and McKim v. Voor-
hies, which had been cited by Story. The California court relied on a general state-
ment in i KENT, COMMENTARIES *409.
25. With respect to injunctions against proceedings after judgment, see Clark v.
Bankers' Trust Co., 177 App. Div. 627, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544 (Ist Dep't 1917) ; Beards-
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diction could determine for itself as the cases came up how far comity
restrained the granting of injunctions.
INJUNCTIONS NOT ANCILLARY TO A STATE JUDGMENT
At the outset some recurrent factors not related to the type of injunc-
tion sought must be pointed out, the presence of which has often influenced
the decision of the cases. Among these factors the traditional dogma that
a court will never directly enjoin another one is foremost. But'any limita-
tion of Story's rule to such exceptional and improbable injunctions would
be tantamount to an outright rejection of it. Some courts, however, when
desirous to grant the injunction sought, have been prone to resort to that
distinction in self-justification 26 and, conversely, courts which wanted to
dissolve or disregard a standing injunction have frequently labeled it an
injunction "to the court".27  State courts have also displayed a great reluc-
tance to restrain suits closely related to matters coming within exclusive
federal jurisdiction 28 and, a fortiori, no injunction can be granted when
the state court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the federal
proceedings involved.29 A third factor is the removability of a case to a
federal court; such a removal cannot be enjoined. 0
In the absence of such exceptional factors the cases fall into three main
categories: The complainant may ask the state court to grant an injunction
against a federal suit not yet commenced, or against pending proceedings
prior to judgment, or against proceedings after judgment. The interpre-
tation of "proceedings" in the federal statute has been the subject of judicial
lee v. Ingraham, 183 N. Y. 411, 76 N. E. 476 (i9o6) ; with which compare Prugh v.
Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896).
26. E. g., Shaw v. Frey, 69 N. J. Eq. 321, 59 AtI. 8I (Ch. Io5) ; Home Ins. Co.
v. Howell, 24 N. J. Eq. 238 (Ch. 1873). Cf. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 599
(1891), where Mr. Justice Harlan made this distinction with respect to a federal-state
injunction; and see the conclirring opinion in Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen &
Co., 195 App. Div. 161, 16q, 186 N. Y. Supp. 338, 344 (Ist Dep't 1921).
27. Prugh v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 3o9 (1896);
Beardslee v. Ingraham, 183 N. Y. 411, 76 N. E. 476 (i9o6) ; English v. Miller, 2 Rich.
Eq. 320 (S. C. 1845) (injunctions against marshall denied). See also Standard Steel
Works Co. v. Williams, 158 Ga. 434, 124 S. E. 21 (924) (injunction against a federal
receiver denied) ; Johnstown Mining Co. v. Morse, 44 Misc. 504, 90 N. Y. Supp. 107
(Sup. Ct. 1904) (injunction against federal contempt proceedings denied).
In Clark v. Bankers' Trust Co., 177 App. Div. 627, 638, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544, 552
(Ist Dep't 1917), rev'g, 99 Misc. 300, 163 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1917), the court
stated that the effect of the injunction was "to restrain the, United States" court and
dictate the form of its decree".
28. Wheeler v. Vimalert Co., 235 App. Div. 643, 255 N. Y. Supp. 114 (2d Dep't
1932) (admiralty); Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 195 App. Div. 161, 186
N. Y. Supp. 338 (ist Dep't 1921) (admiralty); Clark v. Bankers' Trust Co., 177 App.
Div. 627, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544 (Ist Dep't 1917) (reorganization in bankruptcy); Johns-
town Mining Co. v. Morse, 44 Misc. 504, 9o N. Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (con-
tempt proceedings in federal court) ; Thompson v. Van Vechten, 5 Duer. 618 (N. Y.
Super. Ct. 1855) (admiralty) ; Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453' (i86o) (patent) ; Day-
ton Coal and Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 134 Tenn. 221, 183 S. W. 739
(I913), affd, 239 U. S. 446 (1915) (interstate commerce) ; Henderson v. Henrie, 6r
W. Va. 183, 56 S. E. 369 (907) (bankruptcy).
29. U. S.: Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1893) (admiralty) ; see Green v. Por-
ter, 123 Fed. 351, 352 (C. C. D. Mass. i9o3) (patent). Georgia: Fillingin v. Thorn-
ton, 49 Ga. 384 (1873) (bankruptcy).
30. Blydenstein v. New York Security Co., 59 Fed. 12 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1893);
and see Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 232 U. S. 318 (1914). The federal court
will protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the state suit; Maddisonville Traction Co. v.
St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239 (9o5) ; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494
(88o) ; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250 (U. S. 1874). See Toucey v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 6 Sup. Ct. 139, 143 (1941), for a discussion of the nature of this exception to
the federal statute.
NOTES
controversy, but it now seems well settled that the term includes proceed-
ings after, as well as before, judgment.81 As for future proceedings no
attempt has been made to bring them under the statute. None of these
difficulties of interpretation arises, with respect to state-federal injunctions;
the distinctions, however, retain their value, for the more advanced the
proceedings the more inclined will the court be to deny the injunction.
A-Future Proceedings
In this instance the generality of Story's statement is put to the acid
test.3 2  If it were true that there is a total lack of power to grant state-
federal injunctions, every state court should, when enjoining a party from
bringing suit on a cause of action, specify that the restraint does not extend
to possible federal proceedings, and two injunctions, one state-state and
the other federal-federal, would be necessary in every case. Because of the
obvious inconvenience this would entail, a state court, particularly one
which favors a doctrine of reciprocity, will issue an unqualified injunction
and will hold the party in contempt even when the action sought to be
restrained had been brought in a federal court.
In Hines v. Rawson,33 decided in 1869, the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that the state courts have no power to order pending federal proceed-
ings dismissed, but that they can hold the litigant in contempt for having
instituted them in violation of a standing state injunction. The opinion
cited Story and stated that it fully recognized the doctrine that a state court
will not restrain proceedings in the federal courts "even indirectly by acting
on the party" ; 1- this was emphasized by a square holding to that effect in
Bryan v. Hickson 85 decided in the same year by the same court. Therefore
it must have been generally assumed that Story's statement, like the federal
statute, was never intended to apply to future proceedings.8
B-Federal Proceedings Prior to Judgment
This is the situation most likely to be presented and also the one in
which the law is least clear. 7 There is a recurrent notion that whenever
31. It was contended that the statute applied exclusively to proceedings prior to
judgment; Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115 (9,5) ; see French v. Hay, 22 Wall.
250 (U. S. 1874). This contention has been abandoned; see Toucey v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 62 Sup. Ct. i39, 143 (1941).
32. Another instance, in which the necessity of qualifying Story's statement is ap-
parent, is presented when there is a covenant not to sue. The state courts should find
no difficulty in granting specific performance even when the suit covenanted against
was brought in a federal court; see Karcher v. Burbank, 3o3 Mass. 303, 21 N. E. (2d)
542 (939).
33. 4o Ga. 356 (I869).
34. Id. at 359.
35. 40 Ga. 405 (i869).
36. In Wheeler v. Vimalert Co., 235 App. Div. 643, 255 N. Y. Supp. 114 (2d Dep't
1932) the court modified the order of the lower court so as to enjoin prosecution of
future suits, but not of those already commenced in federal courts.
Other cases where the factor of non-pendency is present are Worthington v. Lee,
6I Md. 530 (1883) (injunction against non-resident denied) ; Venice v. Woodruff, 62
N. Y. 462 (1875) (injunction restraining assignment to a citizen of another state de-
nied). In two cases, Fillingin v. Thornton, 49 Ga. 384 (873) and Royster Guano Co.
v. Stedham, 178 Ga. 217, 172 S. E. 555 (934), the injunction was denied. They can
be distinguished; the first because it involved the filing of a petition in voluntary bank-
ruptcy; and the second because the court made application of the doctrine of the res
cases, discussed infra at p. 721, and also .because the defendant had given notice to the
complainant that he was about to bring suit in the federal courts.
37. The courts have generally accepted Story's doctrine. California: Phelan v.
Smith, 8 Cal. 520 (1857). Georgia: Bryan v. Hickson, 4o Ga. 4o5 (x869). New York:
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two courts have concurrent jurisdiction the first one to take jurisdiction
should be allowed to proceed without interference from the other, and may,
in order to enforce observance of the rule by the other court, enjoin pro-
ceedings therein.18
This "rule" may be expressed by courts which do not accept Story's
doctrine. The first case in which it can be so found is Akerly v. Vilas.
In addition to that case the group includes an isolated New York decision "
and several New Jersey cases. In the leading case among the latter, Home
Ins. Co. V. Howell,40 an injunction ancillary to a suit for cancellation of an
insurance policy was issued to restrain a federal action at law on the same
policy. A later New Jersey decision, Shaw v. Frey,4 went much further;
there an original injunction was granted restraining a party to a federal
action from prosecuting it until a necessary discovery should be made,
which the federal court could not order.
It may be treated as an exception to the doctrine by courts which
follow Story.42  Thus in several jurisdictions cases can be found which,
while denying the injunction, mention the "rule" by way of dictum.4  This
excrescence on Story's doctrine was neither well defined nor developed in
many cases; it merely expressed the courts' natural inclination to grant an
ancillary injunction, meant to protect their first acquired jurisdiction, more
readily than an original one. Under Story's rule, however, the distinction
is irrelevant.44  Nor is it desirable to modify the rule to that extent, for
such a modification might occasion races of diligence determinative of the
jurisdiction of the courts, an unfortunate result which should be avoided
whenever possible.
Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. Pr. 448 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) ; Thompson v. Van
Vechten, 5 Duer. 618 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1855) ; Schuyler v. Pelissier, 3 Edw. Ch. *191
(N. Y. 1838); with which compare Town of Thompson v. Norris, 63 How. Pr. 418
(N. Y. Sup, Ct. 1882). See Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun 204, 2o6 (N. Y. 1884),
cited note 2 supra, where the courts of the District of Columbia were seemingly treated
as courts of another state. Pennsylvania: Lyons v. Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank,
214 Pa. 428, 63 Atl. 827 (I96).
38. See Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 625 (U. S. 1849).
39. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hughes, ii Hun 13o (N. Y. 1877). There a
trustee, which had been removed in conformity with the terms of the deed of trust,
was enjoined from maintaining an action; the court failed to discuss the fact that it
was pending in a federal court.
40. 24 N. J. Eq. 238 (Ch. 1873).
41. 69 N. J. Eq. 321, 59 Atl. 811 (Ch. 1905). The opinion contains an emphatic
rejection of Story's dogma. But the decision could have been put on the simpler
ground that the reason for Story's rule was absent from the case. A recent New Jer-
sey case is Fort v. Lang Co., ii8 N. J. Eq. 527, i8o Atl. 395 (Ch. 1935), discussed
infra at p. 722. See also Twaits v. Penna. R. R., 77 N. J. Eq. 103, 75 Atl. iOO (Ch.
191o) (defendant not enjoined from relying in federal courts on a document purporting
to be a release of his cause of action).
42. See the dissenting opinion in McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 35, II N. E.
(2d) 183, 184 (937). The "rule" may also be found under the guise of a general doc-
trine of which Story's dogma constitutes an exception; see In. re Dawley, 99 Vt 306,
324, 131 At. 847, 853 (1926).
43. Alabama: City of Opelika v. Daniel, 59 Ala. 211 (1877). Nebraska: Prugh
v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896). New York: .Etna
Explosives Co. v. Bassick, 176 App. Div. 577, 63 N. Y. Supp. 917 (Ist Dep't 1917);
Barry v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. 15 (N. Y. 1873).
44. Five cases in four jurisdictions have denied an ancillary injunction; Reagan v.
Dick, 76 Colo. 544, 233 Pac. 159 (1925) ; Bryan v. Hickson, 4o Ga. 405 (1869) ; Barry
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. I5 (N. Y. 1873); Mariposa Co. v. Garrison,
26 How. Pr. 448 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) ; Lyons v. Importers' and Traders' Nat Bank,
214 Pa. 428, 63 Atl. 827 (19o6). In both the Colorado and the Pennsylvania cases
state judgment had been rendered prior to the initiation of the federal action.
With the above cases compare the dictum in Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402, 404
(N. Y. 1831), quoted supra at p. 716, where Chancellor Walworth fairly implied that an
ancillary injunction, as distinguished from an original one, might be granted.
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The Res Cases
About the middle of the nineteenth century, as part of the current
tendency to ignore the statute,45 a doctrine of reciprocity was evolved that
when a court, whether federal or state, takes possession of a "res", the
other court cannot interfere.46 The doctrine rests on an obvious founda-
tion; since two courts cannot simultaneously possess the same specific prop-
erty, the first court to take custody of it should thereby acquire exclusive
jurisdiction over it. This led to holdings that federal-state injunctions can
issue, in spite of the statute, to enforce observance of the doctrine by the
state courts.47  Attempts to extend the rule beyond its rationale by terming
any controversy a "res" over which a court acquires exclusive jurisdiction
were defeated in Kline v. Burke Construction Co.
4 s
The rule applied to federal-state injunctions has been by reciprocity
extended to the converse situation. Thus a state court cannot grant an
injunction when the jurisdiction of the federal court over the "res" attached
first; 49 many opinions, while not so holding, rely on this doctrine.59
Finally in the case of Princess Lida v. Thompson,5' the litigation of which
had been paralyzed by cross-injunctions, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that in an action in rem or quasi in rem a state court can enjoin
federal proceedings if its own jurisdiction attached first. This development
of the law thus reached its logical conclusion, and the res cases were
removed from the field of application of Story's doctrine, which, how-
ever, is not inconsistent with their theory for both are compatible with
a practical policy of minimum interference between state and federal
courts.5 2
C-Proceedings After Judgment
While it is true that the courts have often failed to distinguish pro-
ceedings before and after judgment, the distinction was well brought out in
45. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (193o) 43 HARv. L. REv.
345, 366-367.
46. E. g., Taylor v. Carryl, 2o How. 583 (U. S. 1857); Hagan v. Lucas, io Pet.
400 (U. S. 1836).
47. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. g3 (19o3) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Lake St. Elevated R. R., 177 U. S. 51 (19oo); Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. 337 (C. C.
N. D. Cal. 1888).
48. 26o U. S. 226 (1922), with which compare Morrow v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.
App. (2d) 16, 22, 48 P. (2d) 188, 191 (935).
Various problems which are not within the scope of this Note arise regarding the
application of the rule of the Klinw case. For example, when can a proceeding be
called in rent or quasi in rem and how is priority of suit determined? These questions
have been discussed by several writers in connection with federal-state injunctions;
e. g., Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State
Courts (933) 42 YALE L. J. i69, 1178.
49. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R. R., 177 U. S. 51 (,goo);
Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1893) ; Central Nat. Bank v. Hazard, 49 Fed. 293
(1892) ; Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 195 App. Div. 161, 186 N. Y. Supp.
338 (Ist Dep't 1921). Cf. Rogers v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 135 Mich. 79, 97 N. W.
154 (1903).
50. E. g., Morrow v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 16, 48 P. (2d) 188 (1935);
Royster Guano v. Stedham, 178 Ga. 217, 172 S. E. 555 (1934). See Royal Trust Co.
v. Washburn B. & I. R. R., 139 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 7th, 195o) (sheriff held in con-
tempt for physical interference with possession of railroad by federal court where state
court had enjoined receiver from carrying out federal order).
51. 305 U. S. 456 (1939), aff'g, Thompson v. FitzGerald, 329 Pa. 497, 198 At. 58
(1938). For a prior state holding see Marchant v. Wannamaker, 176 S. C. 369, i8o
S. E. 350 (I935).
52. They can be found side by side in one opinion; see In re Dawley, 99 Vt. 3o6,
324-25, 131 Atl. 847, 853-54 (1926).
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Fort v. Lang Co.,58 a New Jersey case decided in 1935; the court, citing
Story, refused to enjoin a party from enforcing a federal judgment but, at
the same time, would have enjoined him from maintaining another suit then
pending in a federal court, had sufficient grounds for equitable relief been
shown.
The first case in which an injunction against proceedings after judg-
ment was, denied, English v. Miller,54 also constitutes the first case decided
on the authority of Story's statement; 55 in this particular situation Story
is supported ex post facto by the overwhelming weight of authority,58 and
most of the courts still word their opinions in terms of lack of power. It
apparently is immaterial whether the injunction is sought against the mar-
shall 57 or against the judgment creditor 5 s or even against a third party
controlling and directing the execution.
59
In addition to the square holdings referred to above,60 there is a line
of federal cases headed by Riggs v. Johnson County 61 in all of which man-
damus had been issued to city or county officials ordering them to levy a
tax to satisfy an outstanding federal judgment against the municipality, and
in every case a state court attempted, either before or after issuance of the
mandamus, to restrain the officials from levying the tax. These state
53. 118 N. J. 527, i8o At. 395 (Ch. 1935). For a prior New Jersey holding that
a state court will not enjoin a federal judgment see Smith v. Reed, 74 N. J. Eq. 776,
70 Atl. 6I (Ch. 19o8).
54. 2 Rich. Eq. 320 (S. C. 1845).
55. Ibid. The court also relied on McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch *279 (U. S.
1812).
s6. Georgia: Strozier v. Howes, 30 Ga. 578 (i86o). Illinois: Logan v. Lucas, 59
Ill. 237 (1871). Iowa: Shimmer v. Hammond, 5I Iowa 401, I N. W. 656 (1879).
Nebraska: Prugh v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896).
New Jersey: Fort v. Lang Co., 11S N. J. Eq. 527, i8o At. 395 (Ch. 1935) ; Smith v.
Reed, 76 N. J. Eq. 776, 7o Atl. 961 (Ch. 19o8). New York: Clark v. Bankers' Trust
Co., 177 App. Div. 627, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544 (ist Dep't 1917) ; Beardslee v. Ingraham,
183 N. Y. 411, 76 N. E. 476f (19o6). Rlwde Island: Chapin v. James, ii R. I. 86
(1874) ; Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453 (i86o). South Carolina.. English v. Miller, 2
Rich. Eq. 320 (S. C. 1845). West Virginia: Henderson v. Henrie, 61 W. Va. 183, 56
S. E. 369 ( 9O7).
57. Prugh v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 3o9 (1896);
Beardslee v. Ingraham, 183 N. Y. 411, 76 N. E. 476 (19o6) ; Chapin v. James, Ii R. I.
86 (1874) ; English v. Miller, 2 Rich. Eq. 320 (S. C. 1845). In Henderson v. Henrie,
61 W. Va. 183, 56 S. E. 369 (I9o7), an injunction restraining a trustee from making
a deed was sought.
58. In addition to the Iowa and New Jersey cases cited note 56 supra, see Prugh
v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896); Clark v. Bankers'
Trust Co., 177 App. Div. 627, 164 N. Y. Supp. 544 (Ist Dep't 1917) ; Kendall v. Win-
sor, 6 R. I. 453 (i86o).
59. Logan v. Lucas, 59 Ill. 237 (1871).'
6o. For dicta to the same effect see Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 624-25 (U. S.
1849) ; McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch *279 (U. S. 1812) ; Shields v. Pipe, 31 La. Ann.
765, 769 (1879) ; Dorr v. Rohr, 82 Va. 359, 370 (1886).
Only three cases have been found leaning the other way. In Barry v. Brune, 71
N. Y. 261 (1877) a third party holding under a fraudulent assignee of an insurance
policy sued and recovered in a federal court after institution of the state proceedings.
The court held that the assignor was entitled to recover on the policy and enjoined the
third party from collecting the federal judgment except the residue, if any, after satis-
faction of the state judgment. In State v. Frost, 113 Wis. 623, 88 N. W. 912 (19o2)
a temporary injunction against a federal receiver was granted which restrained him
from tearing up the tracks of a railroad in conformity with a federal court's order, but
the case was later removed to the federal court. Neither of these cases contains any
discussion of the fact that it was a federal decree which was being enjoined. See also
Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. I, 85 S. W. 71 (195o) which is discussed note 70 infra with
reference to the enforcement of fraudulently obtained federal judgments.
6i. 6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867).
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injunctions were consistently treated as nullities, 82 and state courts have
since refused to grant them. 3
Void or Inequitable Federal Judgments
Several cases have recognized the power of federal courts to enjoin
state judgments which are void, fraudulently obtained, or the enforcement
of which would otherwise be inequitable. The leading case is Marshall v.
Holmes,64 where a state suit for an injunction had been removed to the
federal court which granted the injunction in spite of the statute. There-
fore it was not surprising to see a state court break away from the general
rule and attempt to enjoin a fraudulently obtained federal judgment. In
Stevens v. Central National Bank, 5 the New York court, citing Story's
work though not the relevant section thereof, held that the injunction could
issue since it was merely one to the party and not one to the court. The
case was taken to the Supreme Court 68 which, accurately citing Story, 7
reversed the Court of Appeals; Marshall v. Holmes was distinguished on
the ground that it was a case removed from the state court and that the
federal court had acted with regard to the judgment as if it had been one
of its own. But this was not the basis of the decision in Marshall v.
Holmes,68 and several .cases where the factor of removal was not present
have since established the doctrine with regard to state judgments.6 Since
the state courts are free from any statutory restraint it would seem that a
fortiori they should be able to enjoin federal judgments on similar grounds.
A rule of reciprocity analogous to that well established in res cases would
seem to demand it.70 If, however, a recent pronouncement of the Supreme
62. Amy v. Supervisors, ii Wall. 136 (U. S. 1870); Supervisors v. Durant, 9
Wall. 415 (U. S. I869); Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409 (U. S. 1869); U. S. v. Keokuk,
6 Wall. 514 (U. S. 1867) are the outstanding Supreme Court cases in that line.
63. Gaines v. Springer, 46 Ark. 502 (1885) ; McCullough v. Hicks, 63 S. C. 542,
41 S. E. 761 (19o2); Lea v. Memphis, 9 Baxt. 103 (Tenn. 1877); Supreme Forest
Woodmen Circle v. City of Belton, 66 S. W. (2d) 439 (Civ. App. Tex. 1933).
64. 141 U. S. 589 (1891). This case was followed in later years: Atchison Ry.
v. Wells, 265 U. S. 1O (1924) ; Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 (922) ;
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920) ; Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S.
us (1914).
65. 144 N. Y. 50, 39 N. E. 68 (1894), aff'g, 69 Hun 460, 24 N. Y. Supp. 2i9
(1893). The case involved a. state suit in receivership by bondholders of a railroad
in which suit receivership certificates were issued. Subsequently holders of the certifi-
cates sued in the federal courts and obtained a judgment. Another suit was then
brought in the state court in which the sale of the railroad by the receiver was sought
to be set aside, and the proceedings of execution under the federal judgment, restrained,
on the ground that the first state suit was fraudulent. The opinion relied on Barry v.
Brune, 71 N. Y. 261 (1877), cited note 6o supra.
66. Central National Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432 (1897).
67. Id. at 462. The court pointed out that the New York Court of Appeals had
overlooked § 9oo of Story's work, which contains the exception to the general rule the
Court of Appeals purported to apply.
68. See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
it; State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 116, 1185.
69. See cases cited note 64 supra.
70. In Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. I, 85 S. W. 71 (I9o5) the defendant in the fed-
eral proceedings had first petitioned the federal court for leave to file a bill of review
for newly discovered evidence of fraud in the obtention of the judgment; the state court
held that the question being res adjudicata the injunction sought could not issue. But
the court stated at 21, 85 S. W. at 76: "There is no doubt . . . that a State court
may entertain a bill to restrain the enforcement of a decree or judgment of a federal
court on the ground that the latter was procured by fraud," and relied on Marshall v.
Holnes. No mention was made of the Stevens case which could be distinguished on
the ground that the fraud was one step further removed since it affected the first state
judgment on which the federal judgment was based.
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Court 71 is a fair indication of a new attitude, the line of cases following
Marshall v. Holmes may be overruled in the future. Such a decision would
be justified not merely on statutory grounds but also on the fundamental
ground that state courts are well enough equipped with equity powers to
deal with their own judgments or those of a sister state without the inter-
vention of federal courts, though of course under the supervision of the
Supreme Court. While Central National Bank v. Stevens constitutes an
anomaly under the law as it now stands, it nevertheless reaches a desirable
result. State-federal injunctions not ancillary to a state judgment (i. e.
original injunctions and injunctions ancillary to a state suit not yet come
to judgment) should be consistently denied whether they are sought against
pending proceedings after or before judgment.
ANCILLARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL RELITIGATION OF STATE
ADJUDICATED ISSUES
When the state court has rendered judgment and the vanquished party
attempts to relitigate the adjudicated issues in a federal court two courses
are open to the winner: he may either plead res judicata in the federal suit,
or attempt to get an ancillary injunction from the court which rendered
judgment.
Only two relitigation cases have been found where a state-federal in-
junction was sought. In one of them 72 the injunction was granted and in
the other one 73 denied. Those cases are necessarily inconclusive, not only
because of their surprisingly small number, but because they contain very
little discussion of the relitigation problem as such.
The converse situation has given rise to several decisions and until last
year it seemed settled that a federal court could, in spite of the statute,
grant such a federal-state injunction. However, the Supreme Court in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.7 4 for the first time enforced the statute
literally. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the court and made
it plain that in his eyes the statute was not a mere declaratory enactment;
that the res cases constitute the only true non-statutory exception,75 and
that since their "reciprocal doctrine . . . is but an application of the reason
underlying the Act" 71 that exception is justified. Mr. Justice Reed filed
a strong dissent, in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts con-
curred, emphasizing that the court was disregarding some of its previous
decisions. The fact remains, however, that after its many vicissitudes, the
statute was ultimately resurrected.
It is believed that the Supreme Court's decision in the T7oucey case,
despite the possible criticism that it overrules prior cases by implication, is
commendable insofar as it may be part of a general effort to do away with
loose standards of statutory construction which have caused the courts to
exercise excessive legislative powers. But it is submitted that Congress
should reconsider the federal statute and amend it so as to exclude relitiga-
tion cases from its operation; for there does not seem to be any valid
answer to Mr. justice Reed's policy argument:
71. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 139, 145 (1941).
72. Reagan v. Dick, 76 Colo. 544; 233 Pac. 159 (1925).
73. Lyons v. Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank, 214 Pa. 428, 63 AtI. 827 (igo6).
74. 62 Sup. Ct. 139 (i941). The cases on point are collected and analyzed in the
majority opinion and in Mr. Justice Reed's dissent
75. The removal cases are treated as another statutory exception; id. at 143.
76. Id. at 145.
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".. . a federal judgment entered perhaps after years of expense in
money and energy and after the production of thousands of pages of
evidence comes to nothing that is final. It is to be only the basis for
a plea of res judicata which is to be examined by another court, unfa-
miliar with the record already made, to determine whether the issues
were or were not settled by the former adjudication. We, too, desire
that the difficulties innate in the federal system of government may be
smoothed away without a clash of sovereignties but we find no cause of
alarm in affirming a court which forbids parties bound by its decree to
fight the battle over on another day and field. We should not in
reaching for theoretical symmetry hamper the efficiency and needlessly
break the continuity of our judicial methodology." 77
This can be said with equal force of a state judgment. It is true that the
circuitous route which one enters with a plea of res judicata and which
ultimately leads to the Supreme Court, may be somewhat shorter than in
the converse situation; but it remains burdensomely unnecessary as long as
the smoother way of the state injunction stays open. State-federal in-
junctions against relitigation of issues previously adjudicated in the state
courts should be freely granted; the Toucey case cannot properly be relied
on to oppose that result since it was decided on statutory grounds. The
Supreme Court had previously made it clear that, in the absence of a statute,
federal-state injunctions against relitigation of issues previously adjudicated
in the federal courts were proper and a similar rule should obtain in the
converse situation.
THE CASES DECIDED UNDER THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
These cases properly form a class by themselves because of the differ-
ent approach adopted by the courts. They have generally failed to discuss
the cases in terms of state-federal injunctions and have confined themselves
to deciding whether the employee's vexatious suit was an undue burden on
interstate commerce and whether an injunction restraining it would entail
denial of a federal privilege of venue. The latter problem arises from the
section of the Employers' Liability Act giving state courts concurrent juris-
diction with federal courts and providing that the action may be brought
in the competent courts of any one of three places: the residence of the
carrier, the place where it is doing business and the place where the cause
of action arose.78  The choice was given to the employee because it was
thought unfair to compel him to go to the forum of the defendant-employer's
foreign domicile. Several cases involving state-federal injunctions have
been decided under the Act; in every one of them the employee sued in a
federal court far removed from his home, from the employer's domicile and
from the place of the accident, each time invoking the "doing business"
provision of the act. Whereupon the employer went to the home state
court and asked for an injunction on the ground that the federal suit would
subject him to increased expense which, the employee being insolvent, it
could in no event recover. No reported case has been found where such a
state-federal injunction was granted but that this was at times done by
state lower courts is evidenced by several references to such injunctions in
the decisions of federal courts from which a cross-injunction was sought.
77. Id. at 148, 149.
78. 36 STAT. i167 (911), 45 U. S. C. A. § 56 (Supp. 1941).
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In McConnell v. Thomson 79 the Supreme Court of Indiana denied the
injunction against proceedings about to be begun in a federal court on the
ground that it would involve a denial of a federal right. One justice dis-
sented and after laying down the general rule "that there is no authority in
state courts to enjoin proceedings in the federal courts" 80 proceeded to
state the familiar dogma that as between courts of concurrent jurisdiction
the one which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties
retains it to the exclusion of other courts.
Apart from two Pennsylvania lower court cases,81 the other reported
decisions are Ohio cases led by Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 2 which
held that Congress, by conferring jurisdiction on the federal court over the
proceedings sought to be enjoined, created a federal right of venue which
a state-federal injunction would deny. The opinion followed McConnell v.
Thom.von and cited with approval the distinction there made between state-
state and state-federal injunctions under the Employer's Liability Act, the
contention of the court being that while Congress can confer concurrent
jurisdiction upon state courts this does not create any federal right of venue
of which a state-state injunction would be violative. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. v. Kepner was affirmed by the Supreme Court at the present tenn.88
The Court stated that the employee's suit did not impose any burden on
interstate commerce 84 and held that to grant the state-federal injunction
would be a denial of the federal privilege of venue created by the statute;
Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the court. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter filed a dissent 85 in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts
concurred; their contention was that the privilege of venue was not absolute
but rather subject to pre-existing equitable doctrines and that the suit being
vexatious should have been enjoined.
Before it thus became settled that an injunction against the employee's
federal suit cannot be granted, the employee often attempted to retaliate by
asking the federal court to issue a cross injunction restraining the employer
from availing himself of the state injunction. In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
v. Schendel 8 6 the Eighth Circuit granted the federal-state injunction in
spite of the statute; reliance wps placed on Kline v. Burke Construction Co.
which was construed to authorize an injunction not only in res cases, but
whenever "necessary". That the Schendel case had misinterpreted the
Kline case was pointed out by the Second Circuit in Bryant v. Atlantic
79. 213 Ind. I6, 8 N. E. (2d) 986 (1937). The same court had previously held
that an injunction would be granted on the same facts against proceedings in the courts
of another state; Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 2o4 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446(1933).
8o. 213 Ind. 16, 37, 11 N. E. (2d) 183, 185 (1937).
81. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Crosby, 37 D. & C. 349 (Pa. C. P. Fayette, 1940);
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Bary, 87 Pitt. L. J. 351 (Pa. C. P. Alleg. 1939). In the
Bary case the court found that the litigation was not vexatious and refused to decide
whether an injunction could issue. The opinion referred to Lyons v. Importers' and
Traders' Nat. Bank, 214 Pa. 428, 63 Atl. 827 (i9o6), cited note 37 .rpra. In the
Crosby case the court rested its decision on Thompson v. FitzGerald, 329 Pa. 497, 198
Atl. 58 (1938), cited note 51 supra, thus misapplying the doctrine of res cases.
82. 137 Ohio St. 409, 3o N. E. (2d) 982 (1940). An Ohio lower court decision
denying the injunction preceded it; Baltimore & Ohio R. . v. Inlow, 64 Ohio App. 134,
28 N. E. (2d) 373 (194o). The opinion in that case, however, had left the way open
for the granting of an injunction when there would be found a "clear invasion of the
rights of the company" and a "great hardship"; at 139, 28 N. E. (2d) at 375.
83. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (14i), (1942) 90 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 489.
84. Id. at 8-9.
85. Id. at ii.
86. 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
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Coast Line R. R.,8 7 which held that no federal-state injunction could issue
to restrain future contempt proceedings in the state court. The Eighth
Circuit came back in Southern Ry. v. Painter 8 where the decision of the
Schendel case was reiterated and the Bryant case adversely criticized; the
dourt cited Story to buttress its statement that the state court was without
power to issue the injunction.8 9 The Supreme Court, shortly after deciding
the Kepner case, settled the dispute by reversing Southern Ry. v. Painter 90
together with Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co. But the three justices
who dissented in the Toucey case, on the ground that an injunction should
issue for the protection of a federal decree, concurred in the Painter case
because no federal decree was involved.91
It has thus been established that, while a state-federal injunction can-
not issue to restrain an employee's vexatious suit under the Act, the federal
court wherein the employee brought the action cannot restrain the employer
from availing himself of an improperly granted state-federal injunction. 2
In only two of these cases was it even hinted that since the original
injunction was sought to restrain a pending federal action in personam,
Story's doctrine could apply. The result in Baltimore & Ohio v. Kepner
could have been reached through that reasoning. Instead the court chose
to put the decision on the ground of violation of a federal privilege of venue,
thus adopting the reasoning of the Ohio and Indiana courts; no disapproval
was expressed of their distinction between state-state and state-federal
injunctions under the Act.
It is hard to comprehend how there can be a privilege of venue in one
case and not in the other when the same statute conferred concurrent
jurisdiction at the same -time upon both courts. It cannot be said that the
jurisdiction is in one case mandatory and in the other permissive.9 3 The
jurisdiction of the federal courts in such cases is not mandatory since they
might presumably decline to exercise it on the ground of forum non con-
veniens. On the other hand a state, while not required to set up courts to
hear suits brought on federal causes of action, cannot refuse to take juris-
diction over such suits when there exists a competent court to hear them.94
Therefore the jurisdiction of the state courts over these cases can be said
to be just as mandatory as that of the federal courts, and possibly more so
in those states which have not adopted the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. The true difference resides in the fact that the proceedings were
in the one case pending in a court of a sister state and in the other case in
a federal court. The distinction is deep-rooted in the law and constitutes
the only sound justification for a difference in result.
It may be, though there is no indication of it in Mr. Justice Reed's
opinion, that the Court would repudiate that portion of the reasoning of
the Ohio and Indiana courts and hold that in every case there is an absolute
87. 92 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), (1938) I6 N. C. L. Rv. 405. The Sev-
enth Circuit in Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 1o8 F. (2d) 98o (C. C. A. 7th,
194o), contented itself with going ahead and rendering judgment in spite of the state
injunction; both the McConell and the Schendel cases were cited in support of the
court's contention that it was a nullity.
88. 117 F. (2d) I0o (C. C. A. 8th, ig4i).
89. Id. at io6.
go. 62 Sup. Ct. '54 (I94I).
91. Id. at 156.
92. Compare the removal cases cited in note 3o supra.
93. See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 416-420, 30 N. E.
(2d) 982, 985-8 6 (1940) ; McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 27, 29, 8 N. E. (2d)
986, 99o, 991 (1937).
94. McKnett v. St Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230 (1934). But see Douglas v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 387 (1929).
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privilege of venue under the Act. Even then Story's doctrine should at
least provide an alternative, if narrower, ground for the decision.
The attitude of the three dissenting justices was even more unfor-
tunate; Mr. Justice Frankdurter's dictum, quoted in the introduction to this
Note, is undoubtedly correct in that there is no general lack of power to
issue state-federal injunctions, but it implies much more. The implication
seems to be that in the absence of a statute a state can enjoin federal litiga-
tion exactly as it could enjoin litigation in another state. 5 This has never
been the law, nor is it believed that it should be. The long range view of
national problems should not be abandoned merely because the problem of
state encroachments upon federal rights has at the present time lost its
acuity; the issue inheres to the federal pattern of government.
CONCLUSION
When first stated Story's dogma was supported merely by a strong
dictum in McKim v. Voorhies, but it had its roots in the same policy from
which had sprung the statute of 1793. By 1836 the emphasis had shifted
from federal encroachments to state encroachments; the statute was almost
forgotten; Story ignored it and no case relied on it for several decades. 98
It matters little that the emphasis has dgain shifted, or that Story expressed
his dogma in terms of lack of power whereas others construed it as a rule
of "comity" or again that he failed to foresee the exceptions which were to
crop up later on; his dogma was and remains an integral part of the enforce-
ment of a policy of well-balanced relations between state and federal courts.
In the absence of some imperative reason, the intellectually satisfying
rule of reciprocity should be consistently adhered to. Since the cases in-
volving federal-state injunctions greatly outnumber those arising in the
converse situation, it remains proper, whenever no direct conclusive author-
ity can be found, to refer to the former cases for the purpose of finding
what the law should be. The inquiry used to be whether a federal court
would have granted a federal-state injunction. But since the Supreme
Court does not regard the statute as a declaratory enactment any longer,
Story's dogma has ceased to be the theoretical counterpart of the statute.
In every case the logical inquiry should now be whether the federal court,
placed in the converse situation, would, in the absence of the statute, grant
the injunction against proceedings in the state court. Consequently future
decisions placed on statutory grounds will not be helpful unless they indi-
cate what the holding would have been, absent the statute. Up to now only
the field of relitigation has been affected by the changed interpretation of
the statute and in other respects the qualification italicized above may still
be disregarded.
Most iourts will agree that unless the unseemly spectacle of injunc-
tions and cross-injunctions delaying the administration of justice is to be
countenanced, both state and federal courts must be restrained by some rule
of reciprocity from interfering with one another. On the other hand it
is clear that the courts do not totally lack the power to grant such injunc-
tions. The proper solution lies somewhere between reciprocal lack of
95. Mr. Justice Reed stated in the majority opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v.
Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6, 9 (Ig4i), (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 489: "Under such cir-
cumstances petitioner asserts power, abstractly speaking, in the Ohio Court to prevent
a resident under its jurisdiction from doing inequity. Such power does exist." For-
tunately the context and the citations make it clear that the court had in mind injunc-
tions against litigation in another state.
96. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (U. S. 1871) was the first case to rely on the
statute after that long period of oblivion.
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jurisdiction and freedom to enjoin. To label it "comity" may be convenient
as a matter of shorthand and is not harmful if it remains understood that
the term will not carry with it any of the connotations of politeness and
self-restraint which have caused so much confusion. But rather than to use
shorthand it should be stated at length that the Constitution provides for,
or postulates, the co-existence of two separate sets of courts on the same
territory throughout the nation; and thence flows the constitutional neces-
sity of minimum interference, each sovereign generally being left to deter-
mine for itself when the maintenance of proceedings in its courts shall not
be allowed.
When interference by injunction does exceed its constitutional maxi-
mum is properly determined, not through the state courts' individual inter-
pretation of a fluid concept of comity, but rather by the Supreme Court,
since the grant or denial of a state-federal injunction presents a federal ques-
tion. 7 The Supreme Court might well have adopted the rule of thumb, sug-
gested in some cases, that priority of suit determines the right in every case,
and that ancillary injunctions for the protection of that right can issue. In-
stead of that broad doctrine the Supreme Court adopted a rule of necessity
restricting the granting of injunctions to cases in which it becomes impera-
tive because the court has specific property in its custody. When no federal
suit has yet been brought, there can be no reasonable objection to an
unqualified state injunction; such injunctions would undoubtedly be sus-
tained by the Supreme Court as they have been by the state courts. Finally
it seems that priority of judgment should constitute sufficient ground for
the issuance of an ancillary injunction restraining relitigation of adjudicated
issues.
Congress could constitutionally provide stricter rules by enacting a
statutory counterpart of the Act of I793,1" but in the absence of such a
statute the constitutional maximum of interference outlined above should
be adhered to. Nor is it believed that the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co. and Southern Ry. v. Painter foreshadow a repudiation of the doctrine;
nothing in the majority opinions justifies such a conclusion, and it may be
significant that the same five justices formed the bulk of the majority of
the court which in each case denied the injunction, whether state-federal
or federal-state, which the complainant sought to obtain, thus consistently
enforcing the constitutional policy suggested above.
The courts of the United States are provided with ample equitable
powers and nowadays, even more than in Story's time, they can, unfettered
by procedural restrictions, administer full relief in the suits brought before
them. The prohibition of unnecessary injunctive interference with their
proceedings cannot work hardship on the litigants, and such interference,
while fortunately not now prevalent, should never be permitted.
F.H.P.
97. Central National Bank v. Stevens, i69 U. S. 432 (1897) ; Moran v. Sturges,
154 U. S. 256 (1894); see McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch *279, *281 (U. S. 1812).
These cases involved federal proceedings after judgment; but as has been seen above
the Supreme Court makes no distinction, in the construction of the federal statute,
between proceedings after or before judgment; it is therefore submitted that the cases
are good authority. And see Southern Ry. v. Painter, 62 Sup. Ct. I54, I56 (i94I).
98. The power to enact such a statute can be found in the "necessary and proper"
clause; U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 in-fine. It might be implied from Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's dictum, cited supra at p. 7,5, that Congress could constitutionally enact a statute
which would reserve to the federal courts equity powers over federal suits. Such a
statute would be of a nature somewhat analogous to that of the removal statute.
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Deductibility of Interest for Income Tax Purposes
If all taxpayers were idealistic enough to pay taxes unquestioningly,
society would doubtless benefit; 1 however, the more realistic citizen is very
much interested in reducing his taxes.2 While it is not inconsistent with
law to minimize tax burdens," the courts may frown on obvious attempts to
avoid tax responsibilities, 4 but any endeavor to frustrate such attempts must
be based on rules of law.
Not neglected in this attempt to reduce taxation is that section of the
Internal Revenue Act dealing with the deduction of interest from gross
income. This portion of the act reads as follows:
"§ 23 Deduction from Gross Income.
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(b) Interest-All interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness, except on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase or carry obligations (other than obligations of the United
States issued after September 24, 1917, and originally subscribed for
by the taxpayer) the interest upon which is wholly exempt from the
taxes imposed by this chapter." 5
The brevity of this section has caused much difficulty, especially since
Congress has not yet indicated what it considers to be the definition of the
words "interest" and "indebtedness", the two most controversial terms.6
i. A benefit to society would probably be the net result, but some efforts to reduce
taxation may be quite desirable for a degree of opposition may be a check on unbridled
taxation.
2. An interesting study on this subject is found in Rudick, The Problpt of Per-
sonal Tax Avoidance (1940) 7 LAW & COMTEMP. PROD. 243.
In addition to doctrines of lavA that aid the realistic citizen in his quest for tax
reduction, there are agencies to show him their proper application. Such an agency is
depicted in Estate Planning Corp. v. Commissioner, ioi F. (2d) I5 (C. C. A. 2d,
I939), reversing, 37 B. T. A. 418 (1938).
3. Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). In Underwood,
Form and Su bstance in. Tax Cases (93o) 16 VA. L. REv. 327, 329, the rule is well
stated: "It is now, and in fact has been for a long time, well settled that every taxpayer
has a right, so long as he abstains from fraudulent or deceptive means, to so order his
affairs that the least possible amount in taxes will fall upon him."
4. Tax avoidance should be distinguished from tax evasion; the latter is illegal,
while the former is not. Tax avoidance is merely the average citizen's attempt to use
the law to relieve himself of as much taxation as possible.
5. NT. Rzv. CODE § 23 (b) (1940). For an historical survey of this section see 3
PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IxcomE TAXATION (1934) §§ 24.01, 24.02, and
KLEIx, FDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1929) 448. See also the supplements to these
texts.
6. While Congress has not defined the terms in question, the Treasury Depart-
ment has given some indication of what it considers to be the meaning of the terms, asfoIlows: "Interest-Interest paid or accrued within the year on indebtedness may be
deducted from gross income, except that interest on indebtedness incurred or con-
tinued to purchase or carry obligations, such as municipal bonds, first Liberty
loan 3Y2 percent bonds, or (in case of a taxpayer not an original subscriber) obli-
gations of the United States issued after September 24, 1917, the interest upon
which is wholly exempt from tax, is not deductible. Interest paid or accrued
within the year on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry (a)
obligations of the United States issued after September 24, 1917, the interest upon
which is not wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by Title I of the Act, or (b)
(in the case df an original subscriber) obligations of the United States issued after
September 24, 1917, the interest upon which is wholly exempt from the taxes im-
posed by Title I of the Act, is deductible in accordance with the general rules.
"Interest paid by the taxpayer on a mortgage upon real estate of which he is
the legal or equitabl owner, even though the taxpayer is not directly liable upon
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In the absence of legislative expression, they should be given their normal
meanings.
7
THE DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF INDEBTEDNESS
The court in Gilman v. Commissioner 8 held that "The term 'indebted-
ness' as used in the Revenue Act implies an unconditional obligation to
pay", and also that "In order to create an indebtedness there must be an
actual liability at the time, either to pay then, or at a future time." 9
Webster's New International Dictionary defines a debt as "that which is
due from one person to another, whether money, goods or services, that
which one person is bound to pay to another, or to perform for his benefit."
These definitions, viewed in the light of the underlying transaction giving
rise to the debtor-creditor relationship, must be analyzed.10
For purposes of Section 23 (b) an indebtedness may be said to consist
of two elements: (a) a legally enforceable obligation to pay money which
(b) was created in return for valuable consideration. The ordinary situ-
ation giving rise to a debt is created by the passage of goods, money or
services to the debtor. A transaction may, therefore, give rise to a contract
whereby a person is bound to pay another a certain sum, and yet there may
not be a valid indebtedness as far as the Internal Revenue Act is concerned.
Thus, where A gives B a note under seal without receiving anything in
return, there is little doubt that the note would be an enforceable obligation
where the seal retains its common law power.1 Nevertheless this obliga-
tion should not be considered an indebtedness under Section 23 (b) of the
the bond or note secured by such mortgage, may be deducted as interest on his in-
debtedness. Payments made for Maryland or Pennsylvania ground rents are not
deductible as interest but may, if a proper business expense, be deducted as rent.
"Interest calculated for cost keeping or other purposes on account of capital
or surplus invested in the business which does not represent a charge arising under
an interest-bearing obligation is not an allowable deduction from gross income.
Interest paid by a corporation on scrip dividends is an allowable deduction. So-
called interest on preferred stock, which is in reality a dividend thereon, can not
be deducted in computing net income. . . . In the case of banks and loan or
trust companies, interest paid within the year on deposits such as interest paid on
moneys received for investment and secured by interest-bearing certificates of in-
debtedness issued by such bank or loan or trust company may be deducted from
gross income." U. S. Treas. Reg. g4, Art. 23 (b).
7. See Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 56o (1932) for cases on
this point. A typical quotation is found in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S.
364, 370 (1925): ". . . the plain, obvious and rational meaning of -a statute is always
to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a
hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would dis-
cover."
8. 53 F. (2d) 47, 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
9. This definition may be found in Bouvim, LAw DICTiONARY (15th ed. 1883) 785.
io. In this analysis some attention might be given to the probable purpose of this
section of the Internal Revenue Act. It is highly possible that the purpose of permit-
ting the deduction of interest for personal as well as business obligations (interest
otherwise would be merely an expense and as such deductible only when incurred in a
business transaction) is to stimulate borrowing, which in turn would stimulate spend-
ing, and investments; financial and industrial activity would thereby be increased as
would taxes on increased business. In view of these reasons, it can readily be seen that
to permit gifts to be deducted as interest would hardly fulfill the purpose of the statute.
ii. The situation referred to is similar to that in Commissioner y. Park, 113 F.
(2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, i94o), decided under Pennsylvania Law, and in Pennsylvania
the seal makes an instrument valid irrespective of consideration for the doctrine of con-
sideration grew up only after the sanctity of the sealed instrument was already estab-
lished. See Conrad's Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 3 A. (2d) 697 (1938) ; Balliet v. Fetter, 314
Pa. 284, 171 AtI. 466 (i934).
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Revenue Act.1 2 As pointed out by one writer,"' the contract itself, as well
as any payments thereunder are to be considered as gifts, and normally a
debt is not created by the passage of a gift. It is, of course, possible to
make a gift of a note drawn on oneself, but even then the, debt created is
not one intended to be covered by Section 23 (b). Were it possible to
deduct from one's income such gifts as this, there would be too large a
loophole for tax evasion in our income tax statute. Moreover, had Con-
gress intended that gifts such as this be deductible, it would not have limited
Section 23 (o) to deductions for only charitable and similar contributions.
The Trust Arrangement as Regards Indebtedness
Perhaps some of the most ingenious financial arrangements whether
conceived expressly to reduce taxes or not, but which have nonetheless
given taxing officials difficulty, are those involving trusts. For instance,
an individual may place property or funds in a trust without receiving any
consideration; the settlor then "borrows" the funds and gives a note in
return. The "borrower" pays "interest" on the note and then seeks to
deduct the "interest" from his gross income. 4 A slight variation of this
arrangement is to use the note, given without consideration, as the corpus
of the trust.Y5
Generally, the courts and the Board of Tax Appeals have had little
hesitation in denying the deduction claimed, either on the ground of lack
of consideration or the absence of a legally enforceable obligation. Thus in
one case 16 the Board held that there was no true debt where the trustee,
who was also the settlor, had the power to alter the relationship at will,
and also had made no promise to pay the principal of the note. The court
that reviewed this finding held that one could not be liable to a non-existent
trust.'7  In another case,'- the Board decided that the evidence of a prior
arrangement to "borrow" the trust fund and then the rapid sequence of
creating the trust and borrowing the money made the entire arrangement
one transaction so that not even a gift had passed to the intended beneficiary
of the proposed trust. It therefore seems clear that at least a legally
enforceable obligation under traditional contract law is a prerequisite to the
determination of a definition of indebtedness in the Revenue Act.
But more than merely a legally enforceable obligation appears to be
necessary; valuable consideration is also required. Although one case,
Commissioner v. Park,19 appears to be out of line, it is doubtful if it
would stand on review. The court here was of the opinion that since
the note was under seal, it was a binding obligation under Pennsylvania
12. This general concept-distinguishing between indebtedness and an obligation-
is well stated in Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 497 (1946). In that case, however,
there was no indebtedness because the obligation was to return stock in kind and not
to pay money.
13. (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 125. For a similar thought as regards a promis-
sory note given without consideration and therefore held unenforceable, see Simon Ben-
son, 9 B. T. A. 279 (1927).
14. Irene W. Johnson v. Commissioner, io8 F. (2d) 1O4 (C. C. A. 8th, i94o),
affirmmg, 39 B. T. A. 702 (1939); Estate Planning Corp. v. Commissioner, ioi F.
(2d) 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936), affrming, 33 B. T. A. 1003 (1936) ; Marian Bourne Elbert, 45 B. T. A. No. i1O,
Nov. 12, 1941; William P. T. Preston, 44 B. T. A. No. 15o, July 10, 1941.
15. Julius G. Day, 42 B. T. A. O9 (940), affd per curiam, 121 F. (2d) 856 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Jamie A. Bennett, 4o B. T. A. 745 (1939).
16. Irene W. Johnson, 29 B. T. A. 702 (1939).
17. Irene W. Johnson v. Commissioner, io8 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 8th, 194o).
18. Marian Bourne Elbert, 45 B. T. A. No. iio, Nov. 12, 1941.
19. 113 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, I94O), 50 YAIE L. J. 151.
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law,20 and interest paid on the note could be deducted from gross income.
The sealed instrument may make the paper enforceable under applicable
state law, but as stated previously it is doubtful whether Congress intended
to allow as deductions moneys paid under such an instrument. In no other
case has a court been so favorable to the taxpayer.
Though there was no doubt raised as to valuable consideration in the
Park case, for none was present, it must be kept in mind that there are
many cases in which there is a very debatable question whether there is
a valuable consideration sufficient to support the indebtedness claimed.
That such consideration is almost universally required to support the in-
terest deduction is clearly shown by the well reasoned opinion in Estate
Planning Corp. v. Commissioner,21 where it was found that the good will
for which bonds were issued by the taxpayer was sufficient consideration
for the bonds, which were therefore evidence of a true indebtedness.
Corporate Securities as Regards Indebtedness
Probably the most complex group of cases are those involving corpo-
rate securities where the corporation seeks to deduct payments made on the
instruments involved. In these controversies, the problem to be decided is
whether the holders of the instruments are creditors or owners. The Board
of Tax Appeals or the courts rarely give a general definition of the terms
in question. Some legal writers,22 however, have endeavored to pigeon-
hole the holdings into the overworked classification of form or substance.
That such an analysis is strained and of no avail should be apparent. The
arbitrary definitions which arise to differentiate indebtedness from share-
holdership should suffice to demonstrate the failure of the test to aid in
future determinations, for the Board and courts look at both form and sub-
stance.
It has been suggested that
"There is no comprehensive rule which can be relied upon to
decide this question [whether an instrument represents ownership
or indebtedness], but the following characteristics and circumstances
tend to distinguish a certificate of indebtedness . . . from a share of
stock: (i) designation as a bond, debenture, note or other generally
accepted term for an indebtedness; (2) intention of the parties that
the instrument represent a debt rather than a stock interest; (3) fixed
rate of interest; (4) absence of voting powers; (5) parity with general
creditors as to interest and principal; (6) provision for payment irre-
spective of net profits; and (7) maturity date." 23
2o. See note ii supra.
21. ioi F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), reversing, 37 B. T. A. 418 (1938).
22. Note (930) 39 YALE L. J. 025.
23. Parlin, Definition and Classification of Securities Under the Revenue Acts
(1940) 15 IND. L. J. 475. For similar material see (194o) 40 COL. L. REv. io84;
(1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 1363.
Mr. Parlin's second characteristic of an indebtedness (intention of the parties) can
hardly be termed a "characteristic" of an indebtedness, f6r in viewing the instrument
itself, the intention of the parties can be of little assistance in determining whether
there is an indebtedness or not. However, this "characteristic" may be important in
that the court in seeking to determine the nature of the instrument goes beyond the
instrument itself. This fact is pointed out on page 478 of Mr. Parlin's article, where
he says: "Not only have the courts been willing to disregard the name of a corporate
instrument and the terminology of the corporate records, but they have been sur-
prisingly liberal in allowing oral testimony on the intention of the parties even
though the same is in direct conflict With the written records."
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Another important factor is that the usual interest charge is recoverable by
suit. The problem for the court or Board is to determine for the particular
case how many of the named factors are necessary to constitute evidence
of indebtedness, for no comprehensive rule is possible. The complexities
of the problem are emphasized by the ingenuity of corporate financiers who
have almost exhausted the possible combinations of the rights of creditors
with the rights of stockholders.
2 1
Typical of the reasoning employed is that of Meridian & Thirteenth
Realty Co.,2 5 where it was stated that:
"All such questions [whether there was a loan] have to be
decided upon the facts in the particular case . . . There are certain
facts in this case which must be given due consideration but do not
serve to determine the issue. These include, on the one hand, the use
of the words 'preferred stock' and 'dividends', the subordination of the
rights of the preferred stockholders to those of general creditors, and,
on the other hand, absence of voting rights in the preferred stock ....
But the preferred had other and more significant characteristics. Each
share had a fixed maturity date upon which it became payable; the
common was held by nominees for the protection of the preferred; the
holder of a share of preferred could enforce payment of the entire sum
due as a debt in case of default; and the payment of the 6 percent was
not dependent upon profits, but was payable and could be demanded
in any event . . .. The so-called preferred stock actually represented
an indebtedness . .. ."
While generally, as indicated in this case, the use of a particular term
will hardly sway the court, there are cases in which the terms used are con-
sidered an important factor. Thus in Pacific Southwest Realty Co.,26 the
fact that the word "dividend" was frequently used by the parties was con-
sidered determinative of the issue in view of the surrounding circum-
stances. In this case the Board felt that it was not the intention of
the parties to create an indebtedness and that the payments were dividends
since they were out of profits and were not distributed except following the
declaration of dividends. Interesting in this case is the fact that the fore-
going factors were considered sufficient to outweigh the provision that the
stock could be redeemed at par plus any accumulated dividends, and at
failure to redeem them, the holders could enforce payment of the par value
of the stock plus accrued dividends "the same as in any unconditional
claim or debt against the corporation." In this latter aspect the Pacific
case is to be distinguished from the Meridian case; in the latter the power
of the holder to enforce the payment of the entire sum due on default was
a factor in holding the instrument in question to be evidence of a loan.
Fixed maturity is indicated in the Meridian case as a factor of indebt-
edness. That this is important seems clear from Haffenreffer Brewing Co.
v. Commissioner2 7 where the court, in holding no indebtedness to exist,
stated in regard to the lack of a fixed maturity date in the instrument that,
"This is the essential feature of the debtor-creditor relation." This same
thought is expressed in Brown-Rogers-Dixon Co. v. Commissioner 21 where
the tribunal found no loan to exist. There it was said that "It has been
24. See (1938) 5 U. OF CHL L. REV. 3o8.
25. 44 B. T. A. No. 137, July 3, 1941, at pp. 3, 4.
26. 45 B. T. A. No. 74, Oct. 24, 1941.
27. 116 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. Ist, i94o).
28. 122 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4th, i941).
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repeatedly held that one of the fundamental characteristics of a debt is a
definite determinable date on which the principal falls due." It is to be
noted that in this case the instrument refers to a debt and that the principal
was to be payable at the expiration of the corporate existence. This evi-
dently was not considered a "definite determinable date" by the court, which
did not discuss the significance of the provision. In another case,2 9 the
power of the corporation to suspend interest payments did not prevent a
deduction. The court said: "The fact that ultimately he [the holder of the
instrument] must be paid a definite sum at a fixed time marks his relation-
ship to the corporation as that of a creditor rather than shareholder. The
final criterion between creditor and shareholder we believe to be the con-
tingency of payment."
Discussed also by the courts are the factors of preference as to interest
and principal and the element of the promise to pay. In Brown-Rogers-
Dixson Co. v. Commissioner 30 the holder of debenture preferred stock had
no preference either as to the principal or interest over creditors of the
corporation and the court felt this an important factor in holding no loan
to exist. Elsewhere, this characteristic was found to be non-essential.3 '
The importance of the promise to pay was stressed in Bakers' Mutual
Cooperative Ass'n v. Commissioner,3 2 where it was decided that the obli-
gation itself had to contain a promise to pay in order for an unconditional
obligation to exist.
The difficulty of determining whether or not a particular instrument
is evidence of a loan is apparent from the foregoing discussion. Any one
factor can be part' of either a stockholder's or a creditor's instrument; no
one element is determinative, and with the hybrid securities available no
one should be. However, an instrument is most certainly one indicating
a debt if all of three important elements are present: (a) it has a fixed
or determinable maturity date; (b) the principal and payments thereunder
are recoverable by suit; 33 and (c) the payments are not to be solely out of
earnings. These elements fulfill the traditional definition of an "enforce-
able obligation" and are generally accepted as part of creditor paper. The
other factors are relatively unimportant provided these three are present,
but must be carefully weighed if one of the three is lacking.
DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF INTEREST
While there may exist an enforceable obligation of the taxpayer, not
every payment made where an indebtedness exists can be called interest.
What is interest? One of the early concepts was that "Interest is compen-
sation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of'
money, or as damages for its detention." 84 Six years later, in a leading
case on the subject, the court produced a narrower meaning of the term
29. Commissioner v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., 76 F. (2d) ii (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
30. 122 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4th, 194). The court in its opinion stated that the
term was self-contradictory, since "debenture' is used to denote a certificate of indebt-
edness and "stock" to denote ownership.
31. Commissioner v. O. P. P. Holding Corp., 76 F. (2d) 11, 12 (C. C. A4 2d,
1935) : "We do not think it fatal to the debenture holder's status as a creditor that his
claim is subordinated to those of general creditors."
32. 117 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 3d, 194).
33. This factor is mentioned-seemingly as regards an acceleration clause-in Me-
ridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 44 B. T. A. No. 137, July 3, 1941, at p. 4.
In reality, however, a fixed or determinable maturity date indicates that the prin-
cipal is recoverable by suit, so that this factor-recoverability of the principal and inter-
est by suit-may not be very important from this point of view.
34. Appeal of J. W. Bettendorf, 3 B. T. A. 378, 383 (1926).
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when it said ". . . the usual import of the term is the amount which one
has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money." 35 In a more recent
litigation, the court advanced a definition more like that first presented here
when it held that "in the business world 'interest on indebtedness' means
compensation for the use or forbearance of money." 36
It may seem that if the proposed concept of "indebtedness" were
accepted, there would be little more to say. This, however, is not the situ-
ation, for "interest" is the subject of nearly as much conflict as "indebted-
ness" and must be distinguished from other payments that are not interest
but seem very much like it. For instance, where the parties contracting
for the transfer of property provide for installment payments and work out
a sale price and interest thereon, including both in the aggregate price, a
portion of each installment paid represents interest and may be deducted
from gross income by the taxpayer.37 Sometimes, however, the courts are
not able to recognize this split-up of the aggregate price and do not permit
a deduction. There was some indication of a method of recognition em-
ployed in a recent decision where the Board said: "The written contract
is clear and the record as a whole does not show that the parties, when
they made their bargain, really intended to pay any portion of the $4o,000
as interest." 38 This seems to recognize the intention of the parties as
being important and that the intention may be found in either the contract
or in other evidence. However, the mere fact that the deferred payment
price is greater than the cash price does not seem to be sufficient evidence
of an intention to have the price differential considered as interest.39 Evi-
dence of a clear intention to separate the aggregate price seems necessary
for the courts to consider as interest a portion of an installment.
The distinction between a dividend and interest depends, of course, on
the type of security involved; if it is determined that the instrument in
question is evidence of shareholdership, the payments thereunder are
dividends. It is to be noted, however, that the fact that an individual is a
shareholder does not preclude his becoming a creditor also. As a matter
of fact, once dividends have been declared, the shareholder, as respects the
dividends, is a creditor of the corporation, 0 and any interest paid to him on
any obligation may be deducted.
Discount has also been differentiated from interest. In one ease dis-
count was paid by an insurer on premiums paid in advance, and the court,
in disallowing a deduction, said "The discount allowed is not payment for
the use of borrowed money. The discounted sum received is the present
value of the future amount due. The amount of the discount is the amount
the company expects to earn by the use of the money before the regular due
date of the premium." 41 Discount has been permitted as a deduction where
it was a discount on the sale of a bond and the discount was amortized over
the life of the bond.42 In such instance the portion allocable to each year
could be deducted that year. In the case of a note being discounted, the
"discount" is really interest and is permitted as a deduction.43 It therefore
seems that the term "discount" has at different times different meanings
35. Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 56o (1932).
36. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 498 (194o).
37. Hudson-Duncan & Co., 36 B. T. A. 554 (1937).
38. Elliott Paint & Varnish Co., 44 B. T. A. No. 44, April 23, 1941, at p. 7.
39. Ibid.
40. United States v. Guinzburg, 278 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
41. Commissioner v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 114 F. (2d) 314, 326 (C. C. A. ist,
1940).
42. United States Playing Card Co., 15 B. T. A. 975 (929).
43. KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1929) 455.
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and legal consequences. Here again the factual study should be resorted
to; the definitions set forth herein of "interest" and "indebtedness" may
be of assistance in this determination.
ON WHOSE INDEBTEDNESS INTEREST MUST BE PAID
A determination that an indebtedness exists is hardly equivalent to
holding that the taxpayer may deduct ifiterest paid thereon from his gross
income. Though the indebtedness in question may be one arising from a
business or personal transaction,44 the dogma is that it must be that of the
taxpayer.45 The taxpayer must be liable, but the indebtedness need not be
entirely his,4" nor must he be primarily liable in all cases.
47
Where the taxpayer gets the funds in a loan transaction this does not
necessarily mean that the taxpayer is the borrower or that the indebtedness
was his. For instance, no deduction was permitted where the taxpayer,
who received the funds but who was not the borrower, agreed with the
borrower to pay the interest for him.48 Even where the taxpayer contracted
with the lender to pay the interest for the debtor (not the taxpayer) in
return for the creditor's giving the debtor an extension on the debtor's note,
no deduction was permitted.49 These cases emphasize the point that liabil-
ity for the interest alone does not make the debt on which the interest is
being paid that of the taxpayer. In order for interest to be deductible, the
taxpayer must be liable for the principal as well, for it is the principal that
represents the obligation.
The same sort of reasoning prevailed where a stockholder was to pay
to the corporation a proportionate share of taxes, interest, and other ex-
penses of the non-profit organization. Such payments were held not to be
on his obligation because the corporation "insulated" him from the payee.5"
This situation was distinguished in Sterling Morton,5 1 in which the only
apparent difference was that a syndicate was involved instead of a corpo-
ration. A member of the syndicate paying his pro rata share on a note
made by the syndicate manager was allowed to deduct the amount paid as
interest from his gross income. The Board held, ". . . an association will
be considered as a corporation for the purposes of computing the tax upon
its income . . . but will not be considered as a corporation in consideration
of the facts of this case." It therefore avoided its original assumption
"that the syndicate . . . should be considered as being classified for the
purpose of the Revenue Act of 1932 as a corporation."
It is well settled that the taxpayer can deduct interest paid on a mort-
gage or mortgage note on which he is not primarily liable.5 2 A husband
44. Id. at 449; 3 PAUL AND MERTEs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934)
158, n. 5.
45. The doctrine is illustrateed in the cases dealt with in this portion of the Note.
Also on point are: United States v. Collier, 104 F. (2d) 42o (C. C. A. 5th, 1939);
Chester A. Sheppard, Trustee, 37 B. T. A. 279 (1938).
46. Rose B. Larson, 44 B. T. A. No. 167, July 24, ig4i; George A. Neracher, 32
B. T. A. 236 (1935).
47. This is quite apparent in the mortgage cases treated later at pp. 737-738.
48. Orange Securities Corp., 45 B. T. A. No. 5, Sept. 4, 1941.
49. William H. Simon, 36 B. T. A. 184 (1937).
5o. Wood v. Rasquin, 21 F. Supp. 211 (E. D. N. Y. 1937), affd without opinion;,
97 F. (2d) 1o23 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
51. 38 B. T. A. 1270 (1938). A point to be noted is that the Board felt that by
state law, if a note were executed on behalf of a syndicate by the syndicate manager
pursuant to authority granted him by the syndicate, each member of the syndicate
would be liable on the note as a primary obligation.
52. See note 7 supra. On point is George A. Neracher, 32 B. T. A. 236 (1935).
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has been permitted to deduct from his gross income the entire amount of
interest which he had paid on a promissory note made jointly by him and
his wife despite the fact that the note was secured by a mortgage on realty
owned solely by the wife."' It should not be concluded, however, that a
husband will be permitted to pay interest for his wife in all cases and then
claim a deduction for interest paid. Valid consideration in these cases must
run to the taxpayer. Thus in Colston v. Burnet,"4 the court held that
though the husband had endorsed the mortgage notes given by the wife on
her property, he had no legal or equitable title in the property and the obli-
gation therefore was not his. Disallowed also in that case was a deduction
for interest paid on a policy loan which the court found to be the wife's
obligation.
The courts and the Board seem most interested in ultimate liability.
Where it is very likely that the party not solely or primarily liable will
have to pay the principal, he will be permitted to deduct the interest paid.
This is dearly shown in Rose B. Larson,55 where the Board, in permitting
a co-maker to deduct the entire interest she had paid on a note, seemed to
stress the fact that the lender had depended entirly on the taxpayer's credit.
It is to be noted that in permitting a deduction for all the interest paid by
one party on a joint obligation the taxpayer is being permitted a deduction
for interest paid on the obligation of another to the extent that the other is
liable on the instrument.56 This is more evident when it is realized that
the taxpayer could secure contribution from the other obligor.
WHEN THE INTEREST MAY BE DmnucTm
If, then, the payment is on such an indebtedness as has been previously
defined and is a charge for the use or forbearance of money, it is deductible
as interest. The further problem then arises as to when it may be deducted.
There has been comparatively little dispute that the interest to be deductible
for the taxable year must be paid within the year by a taxpayer keeping
his records on a cash basis and must be accrued within the year by one
keeping them on the accrual basis. The decisions merely spell out this
general rule. Thus the Board has held that "The statute should not lightly
be construed to permit interest which ordinarily would accrue ratably so as
to be deductible proportionally to be piled up for deduction in a year when
taxes become important . .. ." 57 However, one may deduct prepaid
interest in the returns for the year of payment where the cash basis of
accounting is employed. 58 Also decided is that a taxpayer having his
records on the accrual system was not entitled to deduct interest paid
within the year but accrued in prior years. 59
53. Ibid.
54. 21 B. T. A. 397 (93o), aff'd, 59 F. (2d) 867 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U. S. 640 (1932).
55. 44 B. T. A. No. 167, July 24, 1941.
56. As regards this matter, the possibility of co-obligors so arranging payments
that they will enjoy the deductions at their convenience should be kept in mind. Thus
one obligor could pay the interest and take the deduction when it would do him the
most good, and any of the other obligors would do likewise. Such arranging of pay-
ments in regard to accounting practice was criticized by the Board in Miller Safe Co.,
Inc., 12 B. T. A. 1388, 1390 (1928). To indiscriminately permit these practices would
enable such a shifting of the tax burden as to hinder tax collection.
57. Miller Safe Co., Inc., 12 B. T. A. 1388, 1390 (1928).
8. John D. Fackler, 39 B. T. A. 395 (1939).
59. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 433, 455 (Ct. Cl.
1930).
NOTES
It is permitted to keep different systems of accounts for different activ-
ities, 60 but a clear separation among activities is necessary and each system
must be consistent within itself. Just as an individual may keep his
accounts separate, so may a parent and subsidiary keep separate accounts
as regards an open account between them. Moreover, the fact that the
subsidiary is in financial difficulties with even a possibility that it may not
be able to discharge its liability is no reason to prohibit it from accruing
interest on a debt owed the parent company."1 - It therefore appears that
if the records of the taxpayer clearly show when he has paid or accrued the
interest, he can deduct the same for the taxable year in which it was paid
or accrued.
CONCLUSIONS
It is evident that Section 23 (b) has received much attention by tax-
payers eager to reduce their tax burdens. 'The courts and the Board have
been hard put to restrict their ingenious efforts, and several restrictive
rules of law have been promulgated. There must be an indebtedness which
consists of (a) a legally enforceable obligation to pay money which (b) was
created in return for valuable consideration; there must be payments on
this indebtedness of interest as distinguished from other payments on other
obligations; the interest must be paid on the taxpayer's own liability; and
it must be clear from the taxpayer's records that the interest was accrued
or paid within the taxable period. In addition to these rules, the courts
and Board, in considering the substance as well as the form of the trans-
action, often go beyond the written instrument and view the circumstances
surrounding the transaction that gave rise to the instrument.
It may seem that the courts and the Board are unduly severe.62 How-
ever, a loose construction of the tax statute would invite wholesale evasion,
which would necessitate additional legislation, creating new problems of
interpretation; strict construction is therefore the desirable policy.
L.E.
6o. Bennett Properties Co., 45 B. T. A. No. i2, Nov. 13, 1941.
61. Panhandle Refining Co., 45. B. T. A. No. lo6, Nov. 12, 1941; cf. Zimmerman
Steel Co., 45 B. T. A. No. 16r, Dec. 17, 1941, where the Board held that the financial
situation of the taxpayer would preclude any reasonable certainty that the interest
would be paid in the normal course of business, and therefore, no deduction was per-
mitted.
62. The courts hold that deductions are purely a matter of governmental grace.
See Deputy Iv. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 493 (1940) ; Anteitam Hotel Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 123 F. (2d) 274, 278 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
